Chapter 12. Poetry of Praise, Poetry of Blame

12§1. As we see from Georges Dumézil's comparative study Servius et la Fortune, Indo-European society operated on the principle of counterbalancing praise and blame, primarily through the medium of poetry. [1] This state of affairs is most overtly preserved in the evidence of Indic and Old Irish, [2] but we must now also include Greek. Thanks to the brilliant synthesis of Marcel Detienne, we are in a position to see the opposition of praise and blame as a fundamental principle in the archaic Greek community. [3]

12§2. It is convenient to start by looking at such conservative Dorian societies as that of Sparta. The clearest evidence comes from Plutarch's Lycurgus: in Sparta, the law was based on two fundamental principles, namely épainos 'praise' and psógos 'blame'. [4] The social function of this antithesis can be seen from the objects of praise and blame respectively: kalôn épainos 'praise of the noble' compared to aiskhrôn psógos 'blame of the base' (Plutarch Lycurgus 8.2, 21.1, 25.2; also 14.3, 26.3). Furthermore, the prime medium of praise and blame was poetry (14.5, 26.6). [5]

12§3. In the traditional Dorian praise poetry of Pindar and Bacchylides, we find the most striking and most appealing sort of confirmation about the poetic function of praise and blame. Not only is praise poetry programmatically called épainos or aînos (verb epainéō or ainéō) by the praise poetry itself but its opposite is specified as psogós (verb pségō), [6] as in the following words of Pindar: {222|223} In other words, the actual antithesis between aînos/épainos and psogós is in itself a poetic tradition. Besides the programmatic words aînos/épainos and ainéō/epainéō, there are other elements in the diction of praise poetry that serve to designate its own function, the most important of which is kléos (as in the passage quoted, Pindar Nemean 7.62). [7] The traditional diction of the praise poetry composed by Pindar and Bacchylides also has inherited, besides psogós, several other words that serve to mark blame as a foil for praise: [8]

{223|224} I draw special attention to the first two entries in the list, éris and neîkos. In Homeric and Hesiodic poetry, we have seen that these words are appropriate for motivating the Trojan War in particular and the human condition in general. Now we see in the diction of praise poetry that éris and neîkos also can have a far more specific function: designating the opposite of praise poetry.

12§4. Of course, blame is inimical to praise in praise poetry only if it is the blame of the noble, since the conceit of praise poetry is that it praises the noble only, not the base. For an illustration, let us isolate the word phthónos 'envy, greed' and examine its use as a foil for praise poetry within such poetry. In Bacchylides 5.188 and 13.199–201, we have just seen phthónos being directly contrasted with ainéō 'praise' (αἰνεῖν and αἰνείτω respectively). [12] He who praises (εὖ λέγειν 'speak well': Bacchylides 3.67) is described as ὅστις μή φθόνῳ πιαίνεται 'one who does not fatten himself on phthónos' (Bacchylides 3.67–68). [13] I draw attention to this combination in view of the following expression in Pindaric praise poetry: We see here a programmatic description of blame poetry (witness the epithet psogerós 'having psógos') as the opposite of praise poetry, in the specific context of rejecting blame within a poem of praise:

12§5. Where the language of blame is unjustified, it is specifically correlated with imagery that dwells on the devouring of meat. As we have just observed, blaming is made parallel to biting; also, the blamer is said to fatten himself on phthónos or on the hatreds of psógos. As we look for further development of this imagery, we come upon the following passage: [14] At line 21, we see that phthónos is the food of the blamer only in a figurative sense: the language of phthónos is his means for getting a {225|226} meal, not the meal itself. [20] But then, we also see at lines 22–23 of Pindar's praise poem a ghastly extension of the same theme: not only does the man of phthónos get a meal, but the meal may actually turn out to be his victim! The verb háptomai at line 22 (ἅπτεται) connotes not only 'grab at food', as at Odyssey iv 60 and x 379, but even 'grab at a victim with the teeth', as at Iliad VIII 339, where the subject of the verb is kúōn 'dog'. Similarly with δάψεν 'devoured' at line 23 of Pindar's poem: in Homeric diction, the same verb dáptō can be applied in contexts where corpses are 'devoured' by dogs rather than by the fire of cremation (Iliad XXIII 183; cf. XXII 339). So also with piaínō 'fatten' in the expression φθόνῳ πιαίνεται 'fattens himself on phthónos' at Bacchylides 3.68 and βαρυλόγοις ἔχθεσιν / πιαινόμενον 'fattening himself on heavy-worded hatreds' at Pindar Pythian 2.55–56: in Homeric diction, dogs devour specifically the fat of uncremated corpses (Iliad VIII 379–380, XI 818, XIII 831–832). [21] In effect, then, the language of praise poetry presents the language of unjustified blame as parallel to the eating of heroes' corpses by dogs.

12§6. Significantly, the language of epic itself quotes the language of blame within the framework of narrating quarrels, [22] and a prominent word of insult within such direct quotations is kúōn 'dog' and its derivatives. [23] For example, Achilles insults Agamemnon by calling him kunôpa 'having the looks of a dog' (Iliad I 159) and kunòs ómmat' ékhōn 'having the eyes of a dog' (Iliad I 225) [24] in the context of their quarrel, which is designated by éris and its derivative erízō (Iliad I 6, 8, 177, 210, 277, 319; II 376), as well as by neîkos (Iliad II 376). [25] The actual words of blame spoken by Achilles to Agamemnon are designated as óneidos 'blame, reproach' by the victim himself (ὀνείδεα: Iliad I 291; cf. I 211). [26] Similarly, in Pindar's praise poem, the quarrel between Ajax and Odysseus qualifies as an éris (ἐρίζει: Nemean 8.22) and as a neîkos (νείκει: Nemean 8.25). In addition, the unjustified blame of Ajax by Odysseus qualifies as óneidos (ὄνειδος: Nemean 8.33). But here the praise poem itself insults Odysseus—not by calling him kuôn 'dog' but {226|227} rather by describing his actions as those of a dog feeding on human flesh. Whereas the righteous indignation of Achilles is formalized in his words of justified blame against Agamemnon, [27] the corresponding indignation of Ajax is taken up by the praise poem itself. But the words of justified blame in Pindar's Nemean 8 are intended not so much against Odysseus but against the unjustified blame in the quarrel that led to the besting of the heroic Ajax by his deceitful adversary.

12§7. After concluding its retrospective on the quarrel between Ajax and Odysseus, Pindar's praise poem has this to say about the language of blame: These words serve as a foil for the words that later conclude Pindar's Nemean 8, where praise poetry itself gets the ultimate praise: [28] Thus praise poetry recognizes its own deeply traditional nature by describing itself as a primordial institution. The ideal opposite of óneidos (Nemean 8.34) is presented as kléos (Nemean 8.36), which the righteous man wishes to leave behind for his children when he dies (Nemean 8.36–37). In the same connection, the praise poem presents the function of the righteous man as the function of the praise poet himself:

12§8. We may round out our survey of the word phthónos 'envy, greed' as a foil for praise poetry by considering a particularly suggestive occurrence at the beginning of Odyssey xviii. Here we see the beggar Iros making neîkos against Odysseus (νεικείων: Odyssey xviii 9), who is himself disguised as a beggar; in his quoted neîkos (Odyssey xviii 10–13), Iros commands Odysseus to get out of his way, threatening that the present éris between the two of them (ἔρις: Odyssey xviii 13) may escalate from verbal to physical violence (cf. Odyssey xviii 38–39). [32] The disguised master of the household refuses to budge from the doorway, answering Iros with these words: The collocation of ólbos and phthónos here is striking in view of a traditional theme found time and again in the actual words of praise {228|229} poetry: that ólbos comes from the gods to the righteous and that it attracts the phthónos of the unrighteous (see especially Pindar Nemean 11.29). Ironically, the ólbos of Odysseus himself is now being threatened by the suitors, whose "messenger" Iros has so much phthónos as to hinder our hero from even entering his own household. [34] Without having to identify himself as the owner, however, Odysseus warns Iros not ‘to have phthónos about the property of others’ (ἀλλοτρίων φθονέειν: Odyssey xviii 18).

12§9. Such excessive phthónos on the part of Iros is directly comparable to phthónos in its function as a traditional negative foil of praise poetry within praise poetry. As we have seen, gluttony is a prime characteristic of phthónos in the diction of praise poetry; [35] hence the saying "words are a morsel for those who have phthónos" (Pindar Nemean 8.21). [36] In fact, we now see from the Homeric description of Iros that his phthónos is manifested in precisely this sort of gluttony; the key word is márgos 'gluttonous, wanton': In the language of praise poetry, the same word márgos characterizes those whose words are inimical to the institution of praise: In short, a man who is márgos is a man who has the mouth of Éris personified:

12§10. From the evidence of such traditional wording, I propose that the story of Iros in effect ridicules the stereotype of an unrighteous {230|231} blame poet. Like the unrighteous blamers who are righteously blamed by praise poetry, Iros has éris 'strife' with a good man (Odyssey xviii 13, 38–39) and makes neîkos 'quarreling' against him (Odyssey xviii 9). Like the blamers, he is márgos 'gluttonous' (cf. Odyssey xviii 2) and has phthónos 'greed' for the ólbos 'prosperity' that the good man gets from the gods (cf. Odyssey xviii 17–19). [40] Moreover, we have seen that the good man who is praised by a praise poem must be a paragon of generosity (hence á-phthonos 'without phthónos', as in Pindar Olympian 2.94). Now we also see that Odysseus himself is generous even with the provocative Iros (οὐ ... φθονέω ‘I have no phthónos': Odyssey xviii 16). In fact, this theme of generosity turns out to be crucial for our understanding of the Iros story, as we are about to see from the comparative evidence of ancient Irish tales. One of the most interesting Irish parallels comes from the Second Battle of Mag Tured: it is a story about the Dagdae, a prodigiously generous heroic figure, and Cridenbél, a prodigiously greedy blame poet. [41] Cridenbél was so gluttonous that his mouth grew out from his chest, not from his face. This poet made it his habit to demand from the Dagdae, under the threat of blame, the three best portions of each of the hero's meals. Noblesse oblige, and the Dagdae's generosity would never allow him to refuse the blame poet's demands. As a result, he became ill from malnutrition. At this point, the Dagdae resorts to deceit: he conceals three gold pieces in the three portions demanded by Cridenbél, and the blame poet unwittingly gluts himself to death on gold—ironically an emblem of ultimate prosperity.

12§11. Like the story of Iros in the Odyssey, this story from ancient Irish tradition ridicules the function of the blame poet in society. Such ridicule is of course intensified in the Odyssey by way of presenting Iros as a beggar. But the actual function of the beggar in society is in fact vitally serious in the overall narrative of the Odyssey, as we see from the figure that serves as a positive foil for the beggar Iros, namely Odysseus himself in beggar's disguise. Odysseus plans specifically to beg for his meals—and the word for ‘meal’ here is daís (Odyssey xvii 11, 19); moreover, he plans to beg from the suitors! A stranger in his own house, the disguised Odysseus is received properly by Telemachus, who gives him food and encourages him to beg from the suitors (Odyssey xvii 336–352); Odysseus responds by praying that Zeus grant ólbos 'prosperity' to Telemachus (ὄλβιον εἶναι: Odyssey xvii {231|232} 354). Odysseus proceeds to beg from the suitors, but the chief suitor Antinoos raises objections to the beggar's presence (Odyssey xvii 360–395). Telemachus rebukes Antinoos: "you want to eat much, instead of giving to the other man" (Odyssey xvii 404). "I myself," says Telemachus, "have no phthónos" (οὔ τοι φθονέω: Odyssey xvii 400). The climactic moment comes when Odysseus begs from the suitor Antinoos. He addresses him as phílos (Odyssey xvii 415), says that the young man seems like the "best of the Achaeans" (Odyssey xvii 415–416), and promises to make kléos for him in return for generosity (Odyssey xvii 418). Noblesse oblige, but Antinoos refuses. [42] In fact, his refusal not only disqualifies Antinoos himself but also undermines the position of all the other suitors. There is no generosity, says Antinoos, in giving away things that are not one's own (Odyssey xvii 449–452). By contrast, Odysseus shows the ultimate generosity when he tells the "messenger" of the suitors:

that he [Odysseus] feels no

phthónos

if one gives away things that are not one's own (

Odyssey

xviii 16)that he [Iros] is entitled to feel no

phthónos

about things that are not his own (

Odyssey

xviii 17–18).

[43] The suitors merit their death—and Iros, his beating—not for eating the food of Odysseus but for actually denying it to him. Odysseus himself formally blames Antinoos for withholding abundant food that belongs to someone else (Odyssey xvii 454–457), and his words of blame are called óneidos by Antinoos (ὀνείδεα: Odyssey xvii 461).

12§12. To make matters worse, Antinoos is so angered by these words of óneidos 'blame' that his violence is escalated from the verbal to the physical: he throws a footstool at Odysseus and injures him (Odyssey xvii 462–463). Penelope decries this act as a moral outrage (Odyssey xvii 499–504), in that she considers the beggar to be a xénos 'guest-stranger' in the house of Odysseus (Homeric xeînos: Odyssey xvii 501). As we examine the implications of this word xénos, it is appropriate to cite here the formulation devised by Émile Benveniste: Anyone, then, who would consider even a mere beggar as his or her xénos displays the maximum of generosity, since a beggar stands to offer the minimum in reciprocal services. Thus Telemachus in effect reveals the nobility of his royal family by receiving Odysseus in beggar's disguise as a xénos (Odyssey xvii 342–355; hence ξείνῳ/ξεῖνε at 345/350). Antinoos, by contrast, proves himself ignoble by his failure to act likewise, and his bad behavior is compounded when he addresses the injured Odysseus sarcastically as a xénos (ξεῖνε: Odyssey xvii 478). Ironically, the father of Antinoos had been treated as a xénos by Odysseus himself (Odyssey xvi 424–432); it is thus appropriate that Odysseus should address Antinoos as phílos at the very moment that he tests him by begging for food (Odyssey xvii 415).

12§13. Different xénoi have different capacities to reciprocate the generosity of their host, and the swineherd Eumaios perceives that the disguised Odysseus is much more than a mere beggar. In other words, the stranger's capacity to reciprocate is much higher than that of a mere beggar. Thus when Antinoos reproaches Eumaios for inviting "another beggar" to the house of Odysseus (Odyssey xvii 375–379), the swineherd replies as follows: For Antinoos, these words are meant to convey that Eumaios, being a stranger himself, would not invite a low-ranking stranger, such as a beggar; if the stranger is a beggar, then he did not invite him. For Odysseus, these same words mean that Eumaios considers him a high-ranking stranger, such as a seer, physician, carpenter, or poet; if the stranger is one of these, then he did invite him. The sequence of enumerating the four occupations is arranged in a crescendo of detail, starting with a single word to designate the seer (μάντιν: Odyssey xvii 384) and ending with a whole verse to designate the poet (Odyssey xvii 385). Thus the formal presentation of alternatives implies that the stranger is most likely to be a poet.

12§14. Later on, Eumaios tells Penelope explicitly that the stranger indeed has the powers of a poet: The disguised Odysseus merits such a compliment from Eumaios not only when he tells the first-person odyssey of the Cretan adventurer, at xiv 192–359, [49] but also later when he employs a particular form of discourse in asking for an overnight cloak, at xiv 462–506. In these verses, the disguised Odysseus is narrating to Eumaios and his {234|235} friends a story about the Trojan War: it happened on a cold night, during an ambush, that a man was tricked out of his cloak by Odysseus himself, who gave it to his own friend and equal, the narrator! [50] As Leonard Muellner points out, the telling of this story to Eumaios has a parallel purpose: to get a cloak for the disguised Odysseus. [51] "The story is—in more ways than one—proud talk that raises its speaker's prestige (and almost gives away his identity), [52] but in the Odyssey it receives a moral interpretation ... by which Odysseus obtains proper treatment as a guest in the form of ... a symbolic mantle." [53] Significantly, these words of Odysseus constitute a form of discourse that Eumaios himself compliments as an aînos (αἶνος: Odyssey xiv 508). And it is this same word aînos that designates praise poetry within the traditional diction of epinician praise poetry!

12§15. From the evidence of Homeric diction alone, the meaning of aînos may be analyzed further: [54] The aînos told by Odysseus to Eumaios is parallel to the epinician praise poetry of the classical period both in name and in details of {235|236} convention. Consider, for example, the elaborate excuse that introduces the story of the cloak as told by Odysseus: In the epinician praise poetry of the classical period, we find similar formalistic excuses: Moreover, the festive mood that calls for "singing, laughter, and dancing" (Odyssey xiv 464–465) is reminiscent of the formal setting for the epinician praise poetry of Pindar and Bacchylides: a song-and-dance composition performed in an atmosphere of euphrosúnā 'mirth' (e.g., Pindar Nemean 4.1). [58]

12§16. In the aînos told by Odysseus, the actual disposition of the audience constitutes a theme that rounds out the composition; the {236|237} story of the cloak is concluded with an appeal to the host's sense of philótēs 'being a phílos' (φιλότητι: Odyssey xiv 505). In other words, Eumaios the host should be phílos to Odysseus the xénos 'guest-stranger'. So also in the praise poetry of Pindar, the poet may conventionally present himself as the xénos of the patron, who is his phílos: In light of these patterns in traditional diction, we may now see another dimension in the words employed by the disguised Odysseus in his attempt to beg from Antinoos. Speaking as a xénos, however lowly, the beggar addresses the suitor as phílos (Odyssey xvii 415) and promises him kléos in return for any largesse (Odyssey xvii 418). Antinoos refuses to give anything, and in return he gets óneidos 'blame' from Odysseus (ὀνείδεα: Odyssey xvii 461). [59] Generosity and its opposite deserve praise and blame respectively from this poet like figure.

12§17. We have seen, then, from the evidence of Homeric diction that the word aînos designates a mode of poetic discourse appropriate for purposes that go far beyond simply praising a patron. Although aînos becomes the primary word for designating praise poetry even within such poetry, it is also appropriate for designating, more broadly, ‘an allusive tale containing an ulterior purpose’. [60] In the case of the aînos at xiv 508, [61] we see how a tale about a cloak—with the Trojan War as the setting—has won a temporary cloak for the teller as a pledge of the host's disposition as phílos to his guest. As we compare the epinician praise poetry of Pindar and Bacchylides, which is also traditionally designated by the word aînos, we find that the poetic occasion is of course far more grandiose; nevertheless, the poetic form is essentially parallel. Here too, the central element is the deployment of tales taken from Myth—and the Trojan War serves {237|238} frequently as the setting; [62] these tales, moreover, are arranged to convey an ad hoc message of praise and edification to the victor and his family, who are accordingly obligated as phíloi to the poet. A derivative of aînos even conveys the moralizing tone so characteristic of epinician poetry: the compound par-ainéō 'advise, instruct' applies to the edifying instructions given by the Centaur, Cheiron, to the youthful Achilles and also by the poet himself to his young patron (Pindar Pythian 6.23). [63] This derivative word parainéō also applies to the didactic function of the Hesiodic tradition in general, and the application is actually attested in the diction of epinician praise poetry: Such a poetic utterance or épos ('Add preparedness to action!'), which serves as an instructive legacy for the sons of Lampon, is actually attested in the Hesiodic tradition:

12§18. In the sense of 'an allusive tale containing an ulterior purpose', [64] the word aînos applies not only to the specific genre of praise poetry but also to the general narrative device of animal fables. In the poetry of Archilochus, for example, we find aînos designating the fable about the fox and the eagle (fr. 174.1W), as well as the fable {238|239} about the ape and the fox (fr. 185.1W). The word is likewise appropriate for designating the animal fables belonging to the tradition of Aesop. [65] In order to understand the formal connection between fable and praise poetry, we may now turn to the aînos about the hawk and the nightingale in Hesiod Works and Days 203–212. [66] I call special attention to the fable's introductory description of the intended audience: Using the language of Prague School linguistics, [67] we may say that the code of this aînos has a message for kings—but only if they are ‘aware’ (phronéontes, at verse 202). Such a built-in ideology of exclusiveness also pervades the form of aînos that we know as epinician praise poetry. Consider the following programmatic declarations about this genre of poetry by the poetry itself: Praise poetry is ‘understandable’ (sunetá) only for the man who is ‘aware’ (phronéōn). Only ‘those who can understand’ (the sunetoí) can deliver or hear the message of praise. [68] Epic also recognizes this ideology of praise poetry, but it finds expression only in terms of quotations presented before an audience of Achaeans. Consider these words addressed by Odysseus to Diomedes:

12§19. The aînos, then, is a code bearing one message to its intended audience; aside from those exclusive listeners "who can understand," it is apt to be misunderstood, garbled. [70] With this ideology in mind, we will find it easier to understand the semantics of other attested words derived from aînos. I cite in particular a by-form of ainéō 'praise', ainízomai/ainíssomai: this verb means either 'praise' (as in Odyssey viii 487) or 'utter an oracular response' (as in Pindar Pythian 8.40). It can even mean 'speak riddles' (as in Herodotus 5.56)— hence the derivative noun aínigma 'riddle' (as in Sophocles Oedipus Rex 393, 1525). We may also find it easier now to understand the {240|241} semantics of the verb from which the noun aînos is derived: the negative form is an-aínomai 'say no', and the unattested positive counterpart *aínomai must have meant something like 'say [in a special way]'. [71]

12§20. What, then, is the bond of communication that determines who can and who cannot understand the exclusive message of praise poetry? It is, I submit, the same principle that we find in the Homeric ideology of philótēs—the ties that bind the phíloi hetaîroi together. [72] In the Homeric tradition, as Dale Sinos has demonstrated in detail, the dimensions of philótēs are determined by the social base of the Achaean lāós. [73] In the epinician praise poetry of the classical period, on the other hand, the social base for the community of phíloi is the kômos 'revel, celebration, celebrating group of singers/dancers'. [74] The kômos is not only the context for celebrating the victor with praise (cf. Pindar Nemean 3.5, Isthmian 8.4, etc.). [75] It is also, in a larger sense, a formal affirmation of the philótēs that flourishes among hetaîroi 'comrades' in society. This social function of the kômos is evident even in the diction of epinician praise poetry, as the following examples show:

12§21. The recipient of praise is of course phílos both to his hetaîroi in the kômos and to the poet himself (as in Pindar Nemean 7.61–63). [76] Moreover, the poet's function is reciprocal negatively as well as positively. Pindar's own words reveal that the traditional function of {241|242} the poet is to be not only phílos to the phílos but also ekhthrós 'hateful, hostile' to the ekhthrós:

We have here a complete picture of reciprocity between the poet on the one hand and the man who gets the poet's praise or blame on the other. [78] It is also important to observe that the foil for being phílos, being ekhthrós, is described in words that amount to a periphrasis of the notion inherent in the name Luk-ámbēs, which has been traditionally interpreted as 'having the steps of a wolf'. [79] Pindar's words apparently connote the stylized movements of a dance that represents the steps of a wolf. So too with the name Luk-ámbēs: the second half of this compound, like that of i-ambos, seems to indicate an actual dance step. [80] {242|}